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Abstract This paper analyses alternative profiles of opportunity sets for individuals
in an exchange economy, without assuming that individuals’ choices reveal coher-
ent preferences. It introduces the concept of a ‘market-clearing single-price regime’,
representing a profile of opportunity sets consistent with competitive equilibrium. It
also proposes an opportunity-based normative criterion, the Strong Opportunity Cri-
terion, which is analogous with the core in preference-based analysis. It shows that
every market-clearing single-price regime satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion
and that, in the limit as an economy is replicated, only such regimes have this property.
Keywords Opportunity criterion · Competitive equilibrium · Behavioural welfare
economics
1 Introduction
In normative economics, it has traditionally been assumed that individuals have stable
and context-independent preferences over all economically relevant outcomes, and
that these preferences are revealed in individuals’ decisions; the satisfaction of these
assumed preferences has then been used as a normative criterion. However, research in
behavioural economics has uncoveredmany systematic patterns in individuals’ choices
that are not consistent with traditional assumptions about the context-independence
of revealed preferences, calling into question the idea that revealed preferences are
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In this paper, I develop the approach proposed by Sugden (2004) andMcQuillin and
Sugden (2012), in which the objects of normative assessment are profiles of individu-
als’ opportunity sets. McQuillin and Sugden’s papers define an Opportunity Criterion
for assessing such profiles. This criterion does not refer to preferences, and can be jus-
tified even if revealed preferences are context-dependent or dynamically inconsistent.
Those papers show that, in every competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy,
the profile of opportunity sets induced by that equilibrium satisfies the Opportunity
Criterion.1 In the present paper, I ask whether that criterion (or some variant of it)
requires the profile of opportunity sets to have the properties of competitive equilib-
rium. I define a stronger version of this criterion, the Strong Opportunity Criterion.
I show that every competitive equilibrium satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion
and that, in the limit as an economy is replicated, the set of opportunity profiles that
satisfy the Strong Opportunity Criterion shrinks to the set induced by competitive
equilibrium.
Formally, the Strong Opportunity Criterion is closely related to the core, and the
convergence theorem that I present is closely related to the Core Convergence Theo-
rem conjectured by Edgeworth (1881/1967) and proved by Debreu and Scarf (1963)
and (in a mathematically different form) by Aumann (1964). Conceptually, how-
ever, a preference-independent assessment of opportunity profiles is fundamentally
different from a conventional preference-based assessment of economic outcomes.
My results show that close analogues of canonical welfare theorems can be proved
without assuming that individuals act on consistent preferences and without using
preference-satisfaction as the normative criterion. This parallelism suggests that the
concepts of preference and rational choice are less essential to normative economics
than economists have often thought.
2 Opportunity in an exchange economy
I define an exchange economy in terms of a nonempty set I = {1, . . ., n} of individuals
with typical element i and a set G = {1, . . .,m} of infinitely-divisible commodities
with m ≥ 2 and typical element g. For each individual i and commodity g, ei,g ∈
[0,∞) represents i’s endowment of claims on g. I assume that, for each commodity
g,
∑
i∈I ei,g > 0. The m-tuple ei = (ei,1, . . ., ei,m) is i’s endowment vector. The
n-tuple e = (e1, . . ., en) is the endowment profile.2 An exchange economy is defined
by the quadruple < I,G, e, f(.) >, where f(.) is a function, to be defined later, that
specifies the choices that individuals make in this economy, given the opportunities
that are available to them.
1 The two papers use slightly different specifications of an exchange economy, and slightly different formu-
lations of the Opportunity Criterion. The present paper follows McQuillin and Sugden (2012). For details
about the differences between the two formulations, and reasons for preferring the later one, see the 2012
paper.
2 Throughout the paper, I use bold letters to refer to arrays of objects and to array-valued functions. Arrays
that include one object for each individual are called ‘profiles’. I reserve the term ‘vector’ for arrays that
include one price or one quantity for each commodity.
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Economic activity takes place in a single period and consists in individuals’ adding
or subtracting claims to or from their endowments. For each individual i , for each
commodity g, qi,g ∈ [−ei,g,∞) denotes i’s acquisition of g, interpreted as the
net increase in i’s holdings of g. An m-tuple qi = (qi,1, . . ., qi,m) is an acquisi-
tion vector for i ; the universal set of such vectors is denoted by Qi . An n-tuple
q = (q1, . . . ,qn) is an acquisition profile; the universal set of acquisition pro-
files (i.e., the Cartesian product Q1 × · · · × Qn) is denoted Q. An acquisition
profile q is feasible if, for each good g,
∑
i∈I qi,g = 0. The set of feasible acqui-
sition profiles is denoted F (where F ⊆ Q). These feasibility constraints represent
the resource limitations of the economy, under the assumption that all goods are
initially held by individuals as endowments; they are strict equalities (i.e., there
is no free disposal assumption) to allow the model to represent bads as well as
goods.3
I will say that claims held at the end of the trading period are consumed by the indi-
viduals who then hold them, but ‘consumption’ need not be interpreted as something
that individuals value positively. It represents whatever opportunities and obligations
an individual incurs by virtue of holding a claim at the end of the period. Thus, trad-
able commodities can be goods or bads (or, indeed, goods for some individuals and
bads for others). However, commodity 1 (money) will be interpreted as a good whose
consumption is always valued positively. Because I do not use the concept of prefer-
ence, this interpretation cannot be stated as an explicit property of the model, but it
motivates a concept of ‘dominance’ whose role in my analysis is analogous with that
of non-satiation in classical welfare theorems. This analogy will be explained in Sect.
3. Money has a special role in the model as the medium of exchange; the implications
of this will be explained in Sect. 4.
My normative analysis applies to any given exchange economy. Throughout
the rest of this Section, and throughout Sects. 3, 4 and 5, ‘the’ economy will
be taken as fixed, but the results I will prove hold for exchange economies
in general. The objects of normative analysis are alternative specifications of
the opportunities for acquisition that are available to individuals in the econ-
omy.
The opportunities available to an individual i are described by a nonempty oppor-
tunity set Oi ⊆ Qi . The interpretation is that i is free to choose one (and only one)
element of this set. Each qi ∈ Oi is allowable in Oi . A profile O = (O1, . . ., On)
of opportunity sets is a regime. An acquisition profile q is allowable in regime O
if each qi is allowable in Oi , with A(O) denoting the set of acquisition profiles
allowable in O. Notice that an acquisition profile can be allowable even if it is
infeasible.
3 Even in a model in which all commodities are goods, one might want to define feasibility constraints as
equalities, as does Aumann (1964). If feasibility were instead defined in terms of weak inequalities (thus
assuming all commodities to be freely disposable goods), my results concerning the Opportunity Criterion
and Strong Opportunity Criterion would still hold. (Whether or not these criteria are satisfied is unaffected
by the allowability or non-allowability of dominated acquisition vectors, and so is unaffected by the presence
or absence of free disposal options.)
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For any individual i and any acquisition vector qi ∈ Qi , qi is dominated in Oi if
there is some q′i ∈ Oi such that (i) q ′i,1 > qi,1 and (ii) for each g ≥ 2, q ′i,g = qi,g .
Given the implicit assumption that consumption of money is always valued positively,
a dominated acquisition vector qi is unambiguously less desirable than the acquisition
vector q′i that dominates it. Thus to say that qi is dominated in Oi is to say that, were
qi an element of Oi , i would have no reason to choose it.4
I assume that, for each individual i , there is a choice function fi (.) which assigns a
unique chosen acquisition vector qi to every opportunity set Oi ⊆ Qi . The acquisition
profile that is jointly chosen by individuals from regime O is denoted f(O); f(.) is the
joint choice function. If f(O) is feasible, O is said to be market-clearing. Notice that
each fi (.) is defined for, and is therefore specific to, the fixed economy. It can be
interpreted as taking account of any contextual features of that economy that are
potential determinants of i’s decisions and that are independent of the opportunities
or decisions of other individuals.5 Notice that no assumptions are being made about
the mechanism that determines what each individual chooses from his opportunity
set, only that these choices are predictable, given a full description of the contextual
features of the economy.6 Thus, choices may be context-dependent.
The model allows patterns of choice that cannot be rationalised by preferences that
satisfy conventional conditions. The standard account of rational choice would require
that each individual’s choices satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. I do not
impose this requirement, even for a given economy. Thus, for example, an individual’s
revealed preference between two given acquisition vectors may vary according to the
opportunity set in which they appear, as in theories of salience (Bordalo et al. 2013)
and bad-deal aversion (Isoni 2011; Weaver and Frederick 2012). Because individuals’
endowments are treated as properties of the fixed economy, and because choice func-
tions are specific to that economy, the model imposes no restrictions on how choices
respond to changes in endowments. Thus, an individual’s revealed preferences over
given bundles of consumption might vary according to his endowments, as in theo-
ries of reference-dependent preferences (Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Munro and
Sugden 2003).7
In interpreting the concept of a regime, it is useful to imagine that exchange is
intermediated by some trading institution, distinct from the ‘individuals’ of the econ-
omy. This institution might be thought of as an ‘auctioneer’ in the sense of Walrasian
general equilibrium theory, or as a ‘social planner’ in the sense of modern welfare
economics, or as a set of competing profit-seeking ‘traders’ who come to the economy
4 In the ‘small world’ of a partial-equilibrium model, money might be interpreted as potential expenditure
on all goods not explicitly represented in that model. On this interpretation, the idea that consumption of
money is always valued positively is very close to the idea that increases in opportunity are always desirable.
5 ‘Contextual features’ are analogous with the concepts of ‘frames’ and ‘ancillary conditions’ used respec-
tively by Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009).
6 It is not strictly necessary for my analysis that behaviour is perfectly predictable at the individual level.
All that is required is that aggregate behaviour is sufficiently predictable for the trading institution to set
market-clearing prices.
7 Because of the simple structure of choice problems in an exchange economy, there are relatively few
ways inwhich revealed preferences can contravene standard coherence assumptions. The storage economies
analysed by McQuillin and Sugden (2012) allow ‘irrationality’ to take a much wider range of forms.
123
Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity
from outside (as in the model of Sugden 2004).8 The trading institution offers a set of
trading opportunities to each individual; these offers constitute the regime.
Certain kinds of trading institutions may be able to construct opportunity sets in
such a way that, at least in an appropriately-defined equilibrium, the jointly chosen
acquisition profile is feasible. Clearly, this is true of any trading institution that is able
to set market-clearing prices at which individuals are allowed to trade freely, as in the
familiar model of theWalrasian auctioneer or as in a Nash equilibrium of the arbitrage
model presented by Sugden (2004). But there are other kinds of feasible regime,
for example the regime in which no trade is allowed. Opportunity-based normative
analysis, as pursued in the current paper, is concernedwith the evaluation of alternative
feasible regimes for a given economy.
3 Opportunity criteria
It might seem that, in an opportunity-based analysis, the normative value of a regime
should be defined as an aggregate of the values of the opportunities provided to individ-
uals separately by their respective opportunity sets. It might then seem natural to state
as a normative principle that ‘larger’ opportunity sets are more valuable than ‘smaller’
ones – or, more precisely, that the value of an opportunity set is always increased by
the addition of a non-dominated option. Such a principle would be in the spirit of an
important strand of literature on the measurement of opportunity (e.g. Kreps 1979;
Jones and Sugden 1982; Pattanaik and Xu 1990; Arrow 1995). However, this approach
is unsuitable for a normative assessment of alternative profiles of opportunity sets.
If the trading institution is to be interpretedmerely as an intermediary in the transfer
of goods between individuals, it must be assumed to be subject to the feasibility
constraints encoded in F . If that institution offers a market-clearing regime, it is
able to implement the acquisition vectors that individuals in fact choose from their
opportunity sets; but it cannot guarantee to implement whatever acquisition vector
each individual happens to choose from his opportunity set, irrespective of other
individuals’ choices. On a literal interpretation of the Walrasian model of general
equilibrium, it is not clear that points in an individual’s budget set other the point
actually chosen are genuinely available to that individual. In a real market economy,
of course, it is normally reasonable to assume that each individual is free to choose
any point in his budget set, provided that other individuals’ choices are held constant;
but that is because of contingent features of markets, such as the holding of inventories
by firms, that are not represented in my model. Given that my normative analysis is
intended to apply to regimes in general, it would be misleading to assume that every
element of each individual’s opportunity set is a genuine option, irrespective of the
specification of the relevant regime. My analysis is concerned with opportunities for
individuals collectively to choose acquisition vectors that are feasible in combination.
8 It would be possible to close the model by assuming an auctioneer or social planner who is a government
employee, any positive or negative surplus from whose trading operations accrues to individuals as lump-
sum benefits or taxes. Analogously, one might assume a set of traders employed by firms whose shares are
entirely owned by individuals. However, the model is simpler and more transparent if the trading agency is
entirely separate from the individuals.
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The Opportunity Criterion, as proposed by McQuillin and Sugden (2012), is
designed for this kind of analysis. It is a criterion against which, for a given exchange
economy, any regime can be assessed:
Opportunity Criterion. A regime O satisfies the Opportunity Criterion if (i) O
is market-clearing and (ii) for every feasible acquisition profile q /∈ A(O), there
is some individual i ∈ I such that qi is dominated in Oi .
To understand the normative intuition behind the Opportunity Criterion, consider a
market-clearing regime O. If the Opportunity Criterion is not satisfied, there must
be some feasible acquisition profile q′ that is non-dominated for every individual but
which has not been made available. Clearly, no dominance-based argument can be
deployed to show that, had that opportunity been made available in addition to those
given by O, some individual would not have wanted to take it up. The implication is
that individuals collectively lack the opportunity to make a combination of choices
that conceivably they might all want to make and that is compatible with the resource
constraints of the economy. The Opportunity Criterion requires that individuals are
not deprived in this way.9
The Opportunity Criterion can be interpreted as an opportunity-based analogue
of Pareto-optimality. To see the relationship between these criteria, consider a case
in which individuals’ choices can be rationalised by preference orderings with the
property that more money is always strictly preferred to less. In this case, to say
that a regime induces a Pareto-optimal outcome is to say that, given individuals’
actual preferences, no feasible reallocation of commodities away from the jointly
chosen acquisition profile q∗ is Pareto-improving. To say that a regime satisfies the
Opportunity Criterion is to say that every feasible reallocation of commodities away
from q∗ that individuals jointly could conceivably want to make is in fact allowable to
them. The latter statement is stronger. For this reason, proving that a class of regimes
satisfies the Opportunity Criterion can be a revealed-preference method of proving
that that class induces Pareto optimality. Like the criterion of Pareto optimality, the
Opportunity Criterion is silent on issues of distribution.
In proofs of the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibrium, it is normal to assume
that individuals’ preferences satisfy some condition of non-satiation. In my analysis,
the analogue of non-satiation is the role of dominance in the Opportunity Criterion. To
see the necessity for some such analogue, consider the following two-person exchange
economy. Individual 1 has well-behaved preferences over consumption bundles, with
larger quantities of each commodity always preferred to less. Individual 2 has prefer-
ences with a bliss point at some consumption bundle that is strictly dominated by his
endowment. To achieve Pareto optimality, there must be some unilateral transfer of
goods from individual 2 to individual 1, but such a transfer cannot be made by trad-
ing at market-clearing prices. This anomalous case is normally excluded by assuming
non-satiation. In my model, the Opportunity Criterion is defined in such a way that it
9 An equivalent statement of part (ii) of the Opportunity Criterion, used by McQuillin and Sugden (2012),
is that it is not possible to relax the constraints that O imposes on individuals (thus expanding the set of
allowable outcomes) in such a way that some feasible outcome, not allowable in O, becomes both allowable
and non-dominated.
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is not contravened by the absence of an opportunity to make a dominated transaction.
The definition of dominance is motivated by the implicit assumption that consumption
of money is always valued positively.
To say that theOpportunityCriterion is satisfied is to say that the set of all individuals
is not deprived of opportunities to make combinations of choices that are feasible and
non-dominated. But that criterion has nothing to say about the presence or absence
of opportunities for feasible combinations of choices by sets of individuals that do
not contain everyone. The following definitions are preliminaries for formulating a
stronger criterion.
Given the fixed exchange economy (which will be referred to as the whole econ-
omy), I define a sub-economy < S,G, eS , fS(.) > for each nonempty set S of
individuals (where S ⊆ I ) by replacing arrays that refer to the whole economy (and
sets of such arrays) by corresponding components (and sets of components) that are
restricted to S. Such restricted arrays and sets are denoted by adding an S subscript
to the entity that refers to the whole economy. An acquisition profile for S, qS , is
allowable in OS if each of its component acquisition vectors qi is allowable in Oi ;
the set of profiles that are so allowable is AS(OS). A profile qS is feasible for S if,
for each commodity g,
∑
i∈S qi,g = 0. The set of feasible acquisition profiles for S
is denoted FS . Intuitively, this concept of feasibility treats the sub-economy for S as
if there were no possibilities for transfers of commodities between those individuals
who belong to S and those who do not. However, the concept of a sub-economy is to
be understood merely a convenient formal device for representing particular features
of the fixed economy.
The stronger criterion is:
Strong Opportunity Criterion. A regime O satisfies the Strong Opportunity Cri-
terion if (i) O is market-clearing and (ii) for every nonempty set of individuals
S ⊆ I , and for every acquisition profile qS ∈ QS for S such that qS /∈ AS(OS)
and qS ∈ FS , there is some individual i ∈ S such that qi is dominated in Oi .
In relation to the set S = I , this criterion imposes exactly the same restrictions as
the Opportunity Criterion does; so any regime that satisfies the Strong Opportunity
Criterion also satisfies theOpportunity Criterion. But the StrongOpportunity Criterion
imposes restrictions analogous with those of the Opportunity Criterion for every set
of individuals. It requires, for each such set S, that the members of S are not deprived
of opportunities to make combinations of choices that are non-dominated and that
are feasible within the resource constraints imposed by their combined endowments.
Notice that, since a sub-economy is defined for each {i}, the Strong Opportunity
Criterion requires that, for each i , the acquisition vector qi = 0 is allowable in Oi .
That is, it requires that each individual has the opportunity to consume exactly the
bundle of goods he was endowed with.
The Strong Opportunity Criterion can be interpreted as an opportunity-based ana-
logue of the core. In a preference-based analysis, a jointly-chosen acquisition profile
q∗ is in the core of the relevant economy if and only if it is Pareto-optimal in every
sub-economy. Thus, the Strong Opportunity Criterion is analogous with the core in
the same sense that the Opportunity Criterion is analogous with Pareto optimality.
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4 Market opportunity theorems
I now characterise a particular type of regime for an exchange economy– a single-price
regime. In such a regime, for each non-money commodity g = 2, . . .,m, there is a
market price pg expressed inmoney units; this price is finite, andmay be positive, zero
or negative. Each individual is free to keep his endowments if he chooses, but is also
free to exchange claims on non-money commodities for claims on money (and vice
versa) on terms that are at least as favourable as those implied bymarket prices, subject
to the constraint that his holdings of claims on any commodity cannot be negative.
Since all exchanges take place through the medium of money, there is no real meaning
to the concept of a ‘market price of money’, but as a notational convention I define
p1 ≡ 1.10 Formally, a single-price regime is defined by:
Single-price regime. A regime O is a single-price regime if there exists a finite,
real-valued price vector p = (p1, . . ., pm) where p1 = 1, such that for each
individual i ∈ I , every acquisition vector qi ∈ Qi that satisfies g pgqi,g = 0
is either allowable or dominated in Oi .
A single-price regime is strict if, for each i , Oi contains all acquisition vectors that
satisfy g pgqi,g = 0, and no others.
A market-clearing single-price regime describes the opportunities available in a
competitive equilibrium. Notice that the definition of a market-clearing single-price
regime allows the possibility that individuals have opportunities to trade on more
favourable terms than those specified by p. If individuals were assumed not to choose
dominated acquisition vectors,market-clearingwould be possible only if opportunities
of this kind were not in fact taken up: all actual trades would take place at exactly the
prices specified by p.11 Nevertheless, it is necessary to take account of the possibility
of such favourable but non-chosen opportunities when considering what properties of
regimes are implied by an opportunity-based criterion.
The idea of a single-pricemarket-clearing regime is an equilibrium concept. Its use-
fulness depends on an implicit assumption that the trading institution can set prices
that clear markets. But is there any reason to expect that a market-clearing equilibrium
exists? InAppendix 2 I show that amarket-clearing single-price regime exists for every
exchange economy that satisfies specific assumptions about how, in general, choices
respond to changes in prices.12 In classic proofs of the existence of competitive equi-
10 In many general equilibrium models, every good is treated as having its own price, expressed in some
abstract unit of account; the principle that only relative prices matter is then derived from the theorem
that, given well-behaved preferences, excess demand functions are homogenous of degree zero in prices.
Since my model has no concept of preference, this modelling strategy is not open to me. Simply to assume
the absence of money illusion would be contrary to my aim of building a model that can accommodate
non-rational regularities of individual behaviour. My model has only m–1 meaningful prices; p1 ≡ 1 is a
notational convention, not a normalisation.
11 Given the assumption that dominated acquisition vectors are not chosen, the total value of all chosen
acquisitions in a single-price regime, valued in terms of p, is non-negative; it is strictly positive if any
individual trades on terms more favourable than are specified by p. Market-clearing requires that this total
value is zero.
12 One role of these assumptions is to require that, as prices of non-money goods tend to infinity (or as
prices of bads tend to minus infinity), there is excess demand for money. Intuitively, this restriction rules
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librium, properties of demand functions derive from fundamental assumptions about
the properties of rational preferences and about the relationship between preference
and choice. In my modelling framework, in contrast, there is no concept of preference
and there are no consistency restrictions on choice. The additional assumptions used
in my existence theorem can be justified only as plausible empirical generalisations.
In this sense, the theorem is not analogous with classic existence theorems. Never-
theless, it gives some support to the intuitive idea that competition tends to induce
market-clearing, even when individuals do not act on consistent preferences. In the
main text of this paper, however, I simply examine the properties of market-clearing
single-price regimes.
My first main result (proved in Appendix 1) is the following:
Strong Market Opportunity Theorem. For every exchange economy, every
market-clearing single-price regime satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion.
As a corollary of this, I obtain amarginal strengthening of a result proved byMcQuillin
and Sugden (2012):
Market Opportunity Theorem. For every exchange economy, every market-
clearing single-price regime satisfies the Opportunity Criterion.
The Market Opportunity Theorem is the opportunity-based analogue of the First Fun-
damental Theorem of Welfare Economics, as applied to exchange economies. The
Strong Market Opportunity Theorem is the analogue of the theorem that every com-
petitive equilibrium of an exchange economy is in the core.
5 The opportunity convergence theorem
Not all regimes satisfying the Strong Opportunity Criterion are single-price regimes:
Proposition 1 There exists an exchange economy and a non-single-price regime for
that economy such that the Strong Opportunity Criterion is satisfied.
Theexample that I use to establish this result is a two-person, two-commodity exchange
economy in which both individuals have non-zero endowments of both commodities.
Consider a regime O for such an economy in which there are two different (strictly
positive) prices at which commodity 2 can be traded – a high price p2H and a low price
p2L. Individual 1 is allowed to buy commodity 2 at the low price or sell at the high
price (but not both), while the opposite is true of individual 2. The market clears at the
high price, with individual 2 buying from individual 1 (i.e., q2,2 = −q1,2 > 0). I will
call this the two-price Edgeworth box regime. To aid intuition about later results I now
show diagrammatically that this regime does not satisfy the definition of a single-price
regime. I complete the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix 1, where I show that this
regime satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion.
Footnote 12 continued
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Fig. 1 Non-allowable, non-dominated acquisition vectors in a two-price Edgeworth box regime
For each individual i = 1, 2 facing the two-price Edgeworth box regimeO, leti be
the set of acquisition vectors qi ∈ Qi that are neither allowable nor dominated in Oi .
Figure 1 plots1 and2 in a diagram inwhich the horizontal axismeasures acquisition
(by either individual) of commodity 1, and the vertical axis measures acquisition (by
either individual) of commodity 2. 1 is the set of points above and to the right of the
dotted frontier; 2 is the set of points above and to the right of the dashed frontier.
The horizontal and vertical segments of these frontiers reflect the constraint that each
individual’s consumption of each commodity must be non-negative (i.e., for each i
and g, qi,g ≥ −ei,g).
Now (to initiate a proof by contradiction) suppose thatO is a single-price regime.By
the definition of such a regime, there exists a finite price p2 such that every acquisition
vector q2 that satisfies q2,1 + p2q2,2 = 0 is either allowable or dominated in O2.
This is equivalent to saying that the line through 0 with gradient −1/p2 does not
pass through 2. But it is immediately obvious from the diagram that, whatever the
value of p2, this line does pass through 2. So the supposition that O is a single-price
regime is false. But, as I show in Appendix 1, O satisfies the Strong Opportunity
Criterion.
However, there is a sense in which, for a sufficiently large economy, any regime that
satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion is ‘almost’ a single-price regime. I formalise
this idea in terms of replica economies, as first used by Edgeworth (1881/ 1967). This
method of analysis works by taking some economy, replicating every component of it,
and then creating a larger economy by combining two or more of these replicas. The
beauty of this method is that, despite the artificiality of assuming exact replication, it
allows one to investigate the effect of changing the scale of an economy while holding
all other features constant. In a preference-based model, preferences are held constant
as individuals are replicated. In my model, correspondingly, choice functions are held
constant as individuals are replicated.
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Formally, I fix an exchange economy E =< I,G, e, f(.) > with individuals i =
1, . . ., n. For each integer r ≥ 1, the r-fold economy Er is defined as the exchange
economy created by combining r replicas of E . Its joint choice function fr (.) replicates
f(.) in a corresponding way. Similarly, for any regime O for economy E , the r-fold
regime Or is defined as the regime that combines r replicas of O. Thus, Er is an
economy with rn individuals. For each k = 1, . . ., n, each of the individuals k, k +
r, k+2r, . . ., k+(n−1)r in economy Er has the same endowment vector ek , the same
choice function fk , and the same opportunity set Ok as does individual k in economy
E with regime O. Thus E1 ≡ E and O1 ≡ O.
As an illustration of the significance of replication for the Strong Opportunity
Criterion, consider the two-fold replica (E2,O2) of the economy in Fig. 1. Recall
that (E,O) satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion (i.e., in economy E , regime O
satisfies that criterion). O is market-clearing in E and so, by virtue of the definition
of replication, O2 is market-clearing in E2. However, (E2,O2) does not satisfy the
Strong Opportunity Criterion. This is because, in the two-fold economy, individuals 2
and 4 (who are replicas of one another) are deprived of opportunities for trade between
themselves that are feasible for them. To see this, consider any price p2 ∈ (p2L, p2H)
and any x such that e2,1 = e4,1 ≥ p2x and e2,2 = e4,2 ≥ x . Consider the acquisition
profile q{2,4} where q2 = (−p2x, x) and q4 = (p2x,−x). Clearly, this acquisition
profile is feasible for the set of individuals {2, 4}. But q2 ∈ 2 and q4 ∈ 4, which
violates the Strong Opportunity Criterion.
This example illustrates a general property of replica economies: the larger the scale
of an economy, the more difficult it is to find a market-clearing regime that satisfies the
Strong Opportunity Criterion but is not single-price. In fact, in the limit as the scale of
an economy increases, the only regimes that satisfy the Strong Opportunity Criterion
are those that are ‘almost the same as’ single-price regimes.
Consider any pair (E,O) of an exchange economy and a regime for that economy.
For any individual i , for any acquisition vector qi ∈ Qi and any finite real number
ε > 0, let ψ(qi , ε) be the set of acquisition vectors whose Euclidian distance from qi
is no greater than ε. I will say that qi is ‘within ε of being allowable’, or ε-allowable,
in Oi if there is some acquisition vector q′i ∈ ψ(qi,ε) that is allowable in Oi , that qi is
ε-dominated in Oi if there is some acquisition vector q′i ∈ ψ(qi , ε) that is dominated
in Oi , and that O is an ε-single-price regime if there exists a finite, real-valued price
vectorp = (p1, . . ., pm)with p1 = 1 such that, for each individual i , every acquisition
vector qi that satisfies g pgqi,g = 0 is either ε-allowable in Oi or ε-dominated in Oi .
Thus, at sufficiently small values of ε, ε-single-price regimes are ‘almost the same as’
single-price regimes. Then:
Opportunity Convergence Theorem. Let (E , O) be any pair of an exchange
economy and a regime for that economy. If for all r ≥ 1, the r -fold replica
(Er ,Or ) satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion, then for every finite ε > 0,
O is a market-clearing ε-single-price regime.
This result is an opportunity-based analogue of the Core Convergence Theorem
(Edgeworth, 1881/1967; Debreu and Scarf 1963; Aumann 1964). However, the two
theorems are conceptually distinct. The Core Convergence Theorem is about the rela-
tionship between the allocations (i.e., profiles of consumption bundles) induced by
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competitive equilibrium and a preference-based normative criterion. The Opportu-
nity Convergence Theorem is about the relationship between the opportunity profiles
induced by competitive equilibrium and a normative criterion that does not refer to
preferences.
6 Conclusion
Taken together, the StrongMarket Opportunity Theorem and the Opportunity Conver-
gence Theorem characterise a market-clearing single-price regime for a sufficiently
large exchange economy. A market-clearing single-price regime can be interpreted as
representing the opportunities that are made available to individuals in a competitive
equilibrium. In the limit as the size of the economy tends to infinity, such a regime,
and only such a regime, satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion.
I submit that this characterisation says something important about the opportunity-
enhancing properties of competitive equilibrium that does not depend on any
assumptions about the coherence of individuals’ preferences. Intuitively, the Strong
Opportunity Criterion requires that, for any set of individuals in an economy, every
transaction that those individuals might reasonably want to make and that is feasi-
ble, given their endowments, is available to them in their respective opportunity sets.
Let us say that a person is willing to pay for something if he is willing to give up
enough of his endowments to make others willing to play their parts in supplying it
to him. A regime that satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion, one can then say,
allows every individual to get whatever he wants and is willing to pay for. That every
competitive equilibrium has this property, and that every regime that has this prop-
erty is fundamentally similar to competitive equilibrium, are normatively significant
statements.
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7 Appendix 1: Proofs of results in main text
7.1 Proof of strong market opportunity theorem
It is convenient to use the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Consider any exchange economy and any market-clearing regime O for
that economy. Suppose that, for each individual i , there is some function vi : Qi → R
satisfying the following three conditions:
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(i) for all q ∈ Q, for every nonempty S ⊆ I : qS ∈ FS ⇒ ∑i∈S vi (qi ) = 0;
(ii) for all i ∈ I , for every qi ∈ Qi : if vi (qi ) ≤ 0, then either qi is allowable in Oi
or qi is dominated in Oi ; and
(iii) for every i ∈ I , for every qi ∈ Qi : if vi (qi ) < 0, then qi is dominated in Oi .
Then O satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion.
Proof of Lemma 1 Consider any exchange economy, any market-clearing regime O
for that economy, and any list v1, . . ., vn of functions satisfying conditions (i), (ii) and
(iii). Consider any nonempty set S ⊆ I of individuals, and any acquisition profile
qS ∈ QS for S such that qS ∈ FS and qS /∈ AS(Os). By (i), ∑i∈S vi (qi ) = 0. Thus,
either vi (qi ) = 0 for all i ∈ S (Case 1) or v j (q j ) < 0 for some j ∈ S (Case 2). In
Case 1, by (ii), for each i ∈ S, qi is either allowable in Oi or dominated in Oi . Since
qS /∈ AS(Os), there must be some i ∈ S such that qi is dominated in Oi . In Case 2,
by (iii), there is some i ∈ S such that qi is dominated in Oi . Since these results hold
for every nonempty S ⊆ I , the Strong Opportunity Criterion is satisfied. unionsq
Proof of theorem Suppose that, for some exchange economy, O is a market-clearing
single-price regime. Since O is a single-price regime, there exists a finite, real-valued
price vector p = (p1, . . ., pm) with p1 = 1 such that, for each individual i , every
acquisition vector qi that satisfies g pgqi,g = 0 is either allowable or dominated in
Oi . For each i ∈ I , define vi (qi ) = g pgqi,g . It is immediate that this definition
satisfies conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1. unionsq
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In Sect. 6, I exhibited an exchange economy and a ‘two-price Edgeworth box regime’
for that economy. I proved that this is not a single-price regime. To prove Proposition
1, it is sufficient to show that this regime satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion.
The regime can be characterised by using functions vi : Qi → R for i = 1, 2,
defined as follows (with p2L < p2H):
(1) vi (qi ) = qi,1 + p2Lqi,2 if either (i = 1 and qi,2 ≥ 0) or (i = 2 and qi,2 < 0)
and
(2) vi (qi ) = qi,1 + p2Hqi,2 if either (i = 1 and qi,2 < 0) or (i = 2 and qi,2 ≥ 0).
(Intuitively, vi (qi ) is the total net value of i’s acquisitions, calculated at the prices
set for i by the regime, for any acquisition vector qi .) Then, for each i , the regime
is defined by Oi = {qi : qi ∈ Qi and vi (qi ) = 0}. It is easy to show that these vi
functions satisfy conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1, and hence that the Strong
Opportunity Criterion is satisfied. unionsq
7.3 Proof of opportunity convergence theorem
Let (E,O) be any pair of an exchange economy and a regime for that economy and
let I = {1, . . ., n} be the set of individuals in that economy. For each r ≥ 1, let
(Er ,Or ) be the corresponding r -fold economy and regime, with the set of individuals
123
R. Sugden
I r = {1, . . ., rn}. Suppose that the Strong Opportunity Criterion holds for every such
r -fold economy. By the definition of that criterion, every Or is market-clearing.
Fix any finite ε > 0. For each individual i , leti be the set of acquisition vectors for
i that are neither allowable nor dominated in Oi . Each of these sets can be plotted in a
common space Rm where m is the number of goods in the economy. (Each dimension
g = 1, . . .,m of this space measures increments of good g, but without referring to
any particular individual. Compare Figure 1.) Let  be the convex hull of the sets
i for i = 1, . . ., n. Let ∗i (ε) be the set of acquisition vectors for i that are neither
ε-allowable nor ε-dominated in Oi . Let ∗(ε) be the convex hull of the sets ∗i (ε) for
i = 1, . . ., n. By the definitions of ε-allowability and ε-dominance, for each i , every
element of ∗i (ε) is strictly in the interior of .i .
Consider any ω ∈ ∗(ε). By the definition of a convex hull, ω can be constructed
as a convex combination of some finite set of vectors {ω1, . . .,ωN } where each ω j is
an element of ∗i (ε) for some individual i ∈ I and each ω j has a real-valued weight
α j in this combination, where 0 < α j ≤ 1 and  jα j = 1. I will say that i is the
actor for ω j , and write this as i = a( j). The α j weights need not be rational numbers.
However, because the rational numbers form a dense subset of the reals, we can find
vectors ω′1, . . .,ω′N , such that each ω′j is sufficiently close to the corresponding ω j
that it is an element of a( j), and such that ω is a convex combination of ω′1, . . .,ω′N
in which each of the weights α′1, . . ., α′N is a strictly positive rational number.
Now consider, for some r ≥ 1, the r -fold economy and regime (Er ,Or ) that
corresponds with (E,O). The set of individuals in this economy is I r = {1, . . ., rn}.
By virtue of the results established in the previous paragraph, if r is sufficiently large,
we can construct a non-empty set S ⊆ I r of individuals, and an acquisition profile
qS for S, such that S can be partitioned into non-empty subsets S1, . . ., SN and the
following properties hold for each j = 1, . . ., N : (i) the ratio between the number of
individuals in S j and the number of individuals in S is α′j ; (ii) each individual in S j is
a replica of the individual a( j); and (iii) the acquisition vector qi for each individual
i in S j is ω′j . (Note that, because ω′j is an element of a( j), ω′j ∈ Qa( j). Thus it is
legitimate to treat the vector ω′j as an acquisition vector for any replica of a( j).) Given
these properties, qS is feasible for S if and only if ω = 0.
Now suppose that 0 ∈ ∗(ε). Recall that, for each i = 1, . . ., n,∗i (ε) ⊂ .i .
Applying the conclusions of the previous paragraph to the case ω = 0, if r is suf-
ficiently large, there exists a non-empty set S ⊆ I r of individuals, and a feasible
acquisition profile qS for S, such that, for each i ∈ S,qi ∈ i (i.e., qi is nei-
ther allowable nor dominated in Ori ). This implies that (E
r ,Or ) does not satisfy
the Strong Opportunity Criterion, contradicting an initial supposition of the proof.
Thus, 0 /∈ ∗(ε).
Since ∗(ε) is a convex set by construction, 0 /∈ ∗(ε) implies that there is some
hyperplane through 0 that does not intersect ∗(ε), and hence does not intersect
any ∗i (ε). Thus, by the definition of ∗i (ε), for each individual i = 1, . . ., n, every
acquisition vector qi ∈ Qi on this hyperplane is either ε-allowable or ε-dominated
in Oi . Equivalently, there exists a finite, real-valued price vector p = (p1, . . ., pm)
with p1 = 1 such that, for each individual i , every acquisition vector qi that satisfies
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g pg qi,g = 0 is either ε-allowable or ε-dominated in Oi , i.e.„ O is an ε-single-
price regime. unionsq
8 Appendix 2: existence of a market-clearing single-price regime
Consider any exchange economy. For every finite price vector p = (p1, . . ., pm)
with p1 = 1, there is a corresponding strict single-price regime O, defined (for each
individual i) by Oi = {qi : qi ∈ Qi and g pgqi,g = 0}. Thus, considering only
strict single-price regimes, the chosen acquisition vector qi of each individual i can be
expressed as a function of p. And so, for each commodity g = 1, . . .,m, we can write
net excess demand for g (i.e., the sum of the chosen values of qi,g for all individuals i)
as a function xg(p). For any given price vector p, the corresponding strict single-price
regime is market-clearing if and only if xg(p) = 0 for every commodity g. Notice
that if xg(p) = 0 holds for all non-money commodities g = 2, . . .,m, it necessarily
holds for money too. More generally, the value of net excess demand, expressed in
money units by using the price vector p and summed over all individuals and all
commodities, is identically equal to zero, irrespective of whether markets clear. That
is, ig pgxg(p) = 0. This identity (a version of Walras’s Law) is an implication of
the assumption that each individual’s chosen acquisition vector is in his opportunity
set; it does not depend on any assumptions about preferences.
Now consider the following two additional assumptions:
Continuity. For each non-money commodity g = 2, . . .,m, xg(p) is a continuous
function.
Intrinsic Value of Money. For each non-money commodity g = 2, . . .,m, there
is an upper limit price pgU > 0 and a lower limit price pgL < 0, such that,
for all price vectors p, pg ≥ pgU implies x1(p) > 0, and pg ≤ pgL implies
x1(p) > 0.
Since I am not assuming that individuals act on coherent preferences, I cannot follow
the neoclassical strategy of deriving Continuity as a property of the demand functions
of rational individuals whose preferences are ‘well-behaved’. However, I suggest that
Continuity is a plausible assumption about aggregate behaviour in a large economy.
Intrinsic Value of Money expresses the idea that money is always perceived as a
desirable consumption good, and that this desire is never satiated. Intuitively, if the
price of some non-money commodity g is sufficiently high, individuals who have
positive endowments of g will want to take advantage of the opportunity to acquire
large amounts of money by giving up small amounts of g, and so money will be in
excess demand. Similarly, if the price of some non-money commodity g is sufficiently
negative, individuals will want to take advantage of the opportunity to acquire large
amounts of money by taking on small amounts of g, and so again money will be
in excess demand. Because I have not assumed that every individual has a positive
endowment of every commodity, I cannot justify Intrinsic Value of Money as a natural
property of each individual’s demands, considered separately; it is merely a plausible
assumption about aggregate behaviour.
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The following theorem can be proved:
Existence Theorem. For any exchange economy, if Continuity and IntrinsicValue
of Money are satisfied, there exists a market-clearing strict single-price regime.
Proof Consider any exchange economy. Assume that Continuity and Intrinsic Value
of Money are satisfied. Let P be the set of price vectors p that satisfy the condition
that, for each non-money commodity g = 2, . . .,m, pgU ≥ pg ≥ pgL. For any such
price vector p, for each commodity g = 1, . . .,m, let xg(p) be the net excess demand
for commodity g that would occur if p was the price vector in a strict single-price
regime. I now define a tâtonnement function ζ : P → P . For the purposes of the
proof, this is merely a mathematical construction.
As a first step, I define φ(z) = α(1− e−z)/(1+ e−z) for all real numbers z, where
e is Euler’s number and α is some constant satisfying 1 ≥ α > 0. Notice that φ(.) is
a continuous and monotonically increasing function with φ(0) = 0;φ(z) → −α as
z → −∞, and φ(z) → α as z → ∞. Writing ζ (p) as [ζ1(p), . . ., ζm(p)], I define
ζg(p) for g = 2, . . .,m by:
(A1) ζg(p) = (1 − φ[xg(p)])pg + φ[xg(p)]pgU if xg(p) ≥ 0; and
(A2) ζg(p) = (1 − φ[xg(p)])pg + φ[xg(p)]pgL if xg(p) ≤ 0.
Because of Walras’s Law, these equations also define ζ1(p). Because φ(.) is a contin-
uous function, and because (by Continuity) each xg(.) is a continuous function, ζ (.) is
a continuous function from P to P . By construction, P is a closed, bounded, convex
set. Thus, by Brouwer’s Theorem, there is a fixed point p∗ ∈ P such that ζ (p∗) = p∗.
Consider any such p∗. First, suppose there is some non-money commodity g such
that either p∗g = pgU or p∗g = pgL. So, by Intrinsic Value of Money, x1(p∗) > 0.
ByWalras’s Law, there must be some non-money commodity h (whichmay or may not
be g) for which the value of net excess demand is strictly negative, i.e., p∗hxh(p∗) < 0.
By the definition of p∗, ζh(p∗) = p∗h . Thus, either p∗h > 0 and xh(p∗) < 0 (Case 1), or
p∗h < 0 and xh(p∗) > 0 (Case 2). Suppose Case 1 holds. By (A2), [ζh(p∗) = p∗h and
xh(p∗) < 0] implies p∗h = phL < 0, a contradiction. Suppose Case 2 holds. By (A1),
[ζh(p∗) = p∗h and xh(p∗) > 0] implies p∗h = phU > 0, a contradiction. So the original
supposition is false. That is, for every non-money commodity g, pgU > p∗g > pgL.
It then follows from (A1) and (A2) that, for each non-money commodity
g, ζg(p∗) = p∗g implies xg(p∗) = 0. Thus, there exists a market-clearing strict
single-price regime, namely the strict single-price regime in which the price vector
is p∗. unionsq
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